As far as scenario 2, I cannot pass judgment on that. Part of me wants to say that calling the timeout to buy your O more time shows no faith in your D. Although X’s and O’s are important, whats going on between the ears of your players is equally important, and you need every bit of juice you can get on the goal line. However, calling that timeout, getting the right play called, and buying your players a breather is also a plus. In the end I think this is an emotional decision which can only be made by a coach on the sideline, who has a good feel for his players and coaches; and then he has to pray it works.

Going up by eight *almost* makes it a two-possession lead. Obviously, Houston has to a) score a TD, then b) nail a 2-point conversion. Per NCAA statistics, 2-point conversion rates are a shade over 40%, meaning that the percentages are in my favor, and the *worst* case scenario is that the game is tied. Heck, if it all worked right, I might have the ball with a few seconds left with a chance to win.

Clausen was only on the field for 24 of the 74 plays ND ran this last Saturday vs. Purdue.

Another thought . . . to add to consider when looking at Coach Hope’s decision. Is Purdue known for its defense? Nope. Is ND known for its offense? Currently, yes.

Hence, Coach Hope was smart to recognize that his team’s weakness, was a weakness, and that Purdue might need time at the end of the game to try to score one more time.

ND & Clausen were sucking? Clausen played a total of 4 or 5 series total in the entire game, due to injury. On the drive that had ND in the Purdue red zone at the end of the game, Clausen had gone 6/9 for 70 yards. Clausen was on fire getting ND DEEP into Purdue’s red zone.

And based on ND’s last 3-4 games, ND has been top 15 in the country for scoring points.

Hence, Coach Hopes assumption that ND is going to score is a pretty safe bet. Doesn’t matter if its one or 2 plays, ND is probably going to score.

In fact, in the last 5 ND games, ND has never been stopped when within the 10 yard line of the opposing team. They have always walked away with points.

Likewise, the 4th down play that Weis was going to spike the ball and call was a play the coach was extremely confident in (its a Patriots staple that SmartFootball/Chris Brown even wrote about when describing routes that Wes Welker runs … http://fifthdown.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/09/10/happy-feet-how-wes-welker-makes-the-patriots-go/ … see diagram 1, flip play, change personnel & formation and bingo, that’s the play ND won the game on).

Yes, Weis got to call an extra play. But Coach Weis was also extremely confident in his 4th down play. I don’t doubt ND would have scored had they only had one play. It’d be pretty darn difficult for the Purdue safety or LB or whatever at 6’1″ and 220 lbs, to stop ND’s highly talented 6’6″ 260 lb 5 star TE.

ND was going to spike the ball to change personnel and get all the time they wanted to run the one play they were extremely confident in. Instead, they were given the opportunity to try one other play first.

Hence, I think Coach Hope’s decision to call time out was a smart decision.

http://www.footballcommentary.com/earlygame.htm

Looking at one of the tables in that link shows a lot of non linearity in the probabilty of winning around the 8 points mark at the begining of the fourth quarter. That seems to show that Expected Points is clearly not the right metric in that situation.

It is a shame that the site seems to no longer be live. Maybe Brian Burke from Andvanced NFL Stats can run the Texas Tech situation through his win probability model and see what the answer would be for the pros.

In order to make the optimal decision, Coach Leach would need to weigh the EW of and respective probabilities of the following:
A. Go for it and score touchdown on 4th. Up 12-Houston gets ball at approximately their own 30 yard line)
B. Go for it and fail to score touchdown. Up 5-Houston gets ball at approximately their own 1 yard line)
C. Successful FG. Up 8-Houston gets ball at approximately their own 30 yard line)
D. Unsuccessful FG. Up 5- Houston gets ball at the 20 yard line.

If he feels that P(A)*EW(A)+P(B)*EW(B)>P(C)*EW(C)+P(D)*EW(D) then he should go for it; if he feels otherwise, he should kick. According to advanced NFL stats, P(A)=.68, therefore P(B)=.32 I can’t find anything about FG probability, but assuming the Tech Kicker makes the kick 95% of the time, we get

.68EW(A)+.32EW(B) vs .95EW(C)+.05EW(D)

The EWs are practically impossible to predict, however it stands to reason that:
1. EW(A)>EW(B)>EW(D)
2. EW(A)>EW(C)>EW(D)
3. EW(B) vs EW(C) is ambiguous as one could argue the 29 extra yards of field position and the chance to record a safety help Texas Tech as much as the field goal.

If one feels that EW(B) is greater than OR EQUAL TO EW(C), then going for it was NECCESSARILY the right decision.
-setting EW(B)=EW(C), we get the equation .68A+.32B vs .63C+.32B+.05D
-remove .32(B) from each side
.68A vs .63C +.05D
.63A+.05A vs .63C+.05D
.63A>.63C; .05A>.05D therefore .63A+.05A>.63C+.05D

In fact there would need to be a substantial difference between EW(B) and EW(C) in order for kicking the FG to be worth it. For example, if
EW(A)=95%
EW(B)=70%
EW(C)=88%
EW(D)=65%
going for it (EW%=87) is still superior to kicking the FG (86.85). That’s a pretty optimistic EW for kicking the FG (or pessimistic view of going for it), yet rolling the dice is still (marginally) superior. Playing around with the numbers can yield interesting results.

http://spreadsheets.google.com/ccc?key=0AkPHyEHn9kQSdE9VTXRsMkNMYnFVZGJmVF8tRjVreFE&hl=en

As for Purdue and the ill-timed time out. Bad call. Let the clock be your friend, unless your defense is so pitiful they aren’t capable of making two stops.

Working the numbers and stating the probabilities are theoretically interesting. But reality has made it plain that both of these calls were incorrect. In fact, over time, they would be incorrect more times than not.