But don’t think that Paul Johnson can’t run his offense from the gun. As I’ve mentioned previously, it’s perfectly possible to run the same flexbone system from shotgun as from under center. One somewhat well known brand is the “Skee-gun” (or “Ski-gun”), named after Muskegon, MI high school. Below is video of their pistol shotgun based flexbone offense.

Pitches:

QB Keeps:

Give reads: (After the jump)

In the “normal” zone read, the line zone blocks one way while the quarterback reads the backside defender:

There are a variety of counters to this, including the infamous “scrape exchange,” and in response offenses have added third options and bubbles and all manner of other ideas to the outside. But Oregon, along with several other spread teams, have also responded by moving inside, by reading the defensive tackle instead of the defensive end. See the diagram below:

This does a couple things for you. One, it can confuse the “scrape exchange” response, where the defensive end crashes to force a “pull” read by the quarterback while the linebacker loops outside for him, because the defensive end gets blocked and the QB should have a big gap inside. And, second, it gives you flexibility in who you choose to block versus read. As the old saying goes, if you can’t block them, read them.

For example, when LSU had Glenn Dorsey, Urban Meyer and Florida often used this same tactic to read him instead of trying to block him. (And I wouldn’t be surprised if Florida did this against Alabama’s mountainous defensive tackle, Terrence Cody.)

So what does this look like in practice? Fortunately, Trojan Football Analysis has already broken it down, after the Ducks thrashed Pete Carroll’s USC defense with it. Below is some of the photo evidence, though you should go to TFA to read the whole thing.

Below is the same play from a sideline angle:

As you can see, it’s a simple adjustment as well as a simple one. And, for a further wrinkle, I had a reader tell me that Oregon will run the “power” play but read the playside defensive tackle. That will have to wait for another post, however.

Here is a basic explanation. Generally, one way to think of it is that uncovered linemen pull; alternatively uncovered linemen “block back” to get a good angle and the covered linemen pull. Just depends how you teach it. Here are some sample rules:

The aiming point for the Single Back is one yard outside of the tight-end.

If the Center can reach the Nose he will make a “you” call to the strongside guard telling him to pull and block the middle (“Mike”) linebacker. The strongside tackle and tight-end will “tex” — i.e. an exchange: the tight-end blocks down while the tackle wraps around. The tight-end down blocks to prevent penetration; the tackle pulls and runs to reach the strongside (“Sam”) linebacker.

If the center cannot reach the nose he will make a “me” call to the strong guard telling him to block the nose and the center will pull to block the “Mike.” The strongside guard blocks down and to disallow the noseguard from penetrating. The strong tackle and tight-end will “Tex” as described above.

Below is a video of Penn State using what was, apparently, the pin and pull zone. (Courtesy of mgoblog.)

(Note that I could be wrong on identifying this as an example of “pin and pull,” as it could be a simple down or “G” scheme. Though the idea gets across.)

Redskins great John Riggins made a living off the "Power O" play

• The lineman to the side the run is going (playside) essentially “down” block, meaning they take the man to the inside of them. For the guards and center, that includes anyone “heads up” or covering them, but for the playside tackle, he does not want to block the defensive end or other “end man on the line of scrimmage.” These lineman use their leverage to get good angles to crush the defensive lineman, and the fact that they don’t have to block a couple of defenders on the playside frees them to get good double teams and block the backside linebackers. To use Vince Lombardi’s phrase, the idea is to get so much force going that direction that they completely seal off the backside.

 

• They can  do this because they get some help to the playside. First, the fullback (or, more often nowadays, some kind of H-back or other player) is responsible for blocking the otherwise unblocked end man on the line of scrimmage (“EMLOS”). He uses a “kick out” technique, simply meaning he blocks him from the inside to out, in order to create Lombardi’s famous “seal” going the other way.

 

• The final piece of the puzzle is the backside guard (sometimes nowadays a tackle). He pulls and “leads,” meaning he retreats, looks first for the fullback’s block to cut off of, and then heads into the crease looking to block the first defender that shows up — typically the playside linebacker. He can block him whatever direction is best; it’s the runningback’s job to find the open lane.

 

• The runner takes a lateral or slight delay step, takes the handoff from the quarterback, and follow’s the pulling guard’s block. As stated above, he wants to cut off that man’s block and get vertical quickly. It is a power play so he has to be willing to hit the hole fast; it’s not as much of a “read the defense” run as are zone runs, though it is a good complement to it.

 

• If it all works well, the line should have crushed anyone to the inside of the offensive guard, while the fullback has kicked out the end man on the line, and the pulling guard is the runningback’s personal protector. The defender that the guard blocks should never be right, both because the guard has freedom to push him wherever, and the runner’s job is to cut off his block to make him correct — the runner cannot just guess.

Here are a few diagrams and examples. The beauty of the play is its versatility: it is probably the most popular run right now in the NFL, and it is also possibly the most popular run in college among spread teams like Florida, Auburn, or a number of others. (And it has the best name — “power.”)

The first is an example of how the Pittsburgh Steelers used the play a few years ago from a very traditional set, though they used an H-back in motion instead of a fullback. I previously discussed the play for the NY Times Fifth Down.

The Steelers used it to great effect, as Willie Parker had a 75 yard touchdown run in the Super Bowl against the Seahawks. Watch how the H-back goes in motion and kicks out his man, while the guard pulls and leads.

Though when it comes to the “power play,” the most famous use of it this season has been as Ronnie Brown’s go-to play form the Wildcat. The first part of the ‘cat is Ricky Williams on the jet sweep, but the first “counter” in the series is for Brown to fake the wildcat and then take it himself with basic “power O” blocking. Indeed, this is a hint of why the Dolphins are so successful with it: to their lineman, it is the same play that they run from normal sets. Hence why they bristle when other teams try to call what they are doing gimmickry.

Below is a video of the original form of power that the Dolphins ran with the wildcat, with an unbalanced line:

And next is how they are doing it these days, with a balanced line and two tight-ends. The clip below shows first the jet sweep then the fake jet sweep and then the counter. But watch the linemen and the blocking back: you still see the line “down block,” the fullback “kick out,” and the backside guard pull. The rest is cosmetics, though cosmetics work.

Next, we turn to how some of the spread teams have been using power recently. Obviously, a four-wide spread team has a difficult time with the play because they have neither a fullback or an H-back — or do they? The teams, like Florida, with good running quarterbacks are only too happy to use their runningback as a fullback and use their quarterback as a tailback. When they don’t, they still can use a variety of motions to get them into this look. In this way you’ve seen a big synthesis with spread teams in the last four or five years as compared with the previous five. Whereas from 1999-2005 or so spread teams thought it to their advantage to be four and five wide most of the game to fix the defense’s personnel, in the last four or five they have begun using these H-back types more because of their versatility in the run game: they can be lead blockers, they can kick out the EMLOS on power, they can pull and trap or lead to the opposite side, and they can be used in pass protection. In this way you’ve seen a bit of a synthesis with the spread teams in getting what they want and yet co-opting more traditional looks, which used extra bodies for a reason. The spread teams of course pride themselves on doing it smarter, however. Below is a look at how some spread teams use power within their offenses:

And a variety of video cutups, courtesy of Coach Indy:

Finally, to bring it full circles here is another look at the power play from these traditional, “pro-style” looks. The diagram is from an NFL playbook, showing it against several defenses. The video is of the San Diego Chargers using the play with LaDainian Tomlinson.

Having now seen this same play from a wide variety of sets and offenses, note how the “power O” from pro-style, traditional sets has more in common than it does differences with the play run from spread and wildcat sets. Can’t we all just get along?

Many, many "zone gurus" learned from longtime NFL coach Alex Gibbs

Think of this as Newtonian physics for the run game. Yes, Einsteinian physics is more precise and is necessary if you want to understand certain extreme events, but Newtonian physics is extremely useful, easy to understand, and will explain pretty much all you need to know unless you’re currently an offensive line coach (and even if you are, my hope is that this is a pretty good reminder of some things.) Here goes:

On zone plays, the linemen keep the same blocking schemes, regardless of how many tight-ends or wide receivers they use. The aiming point for the runningbacks remain about the same. Many zone teams begin by focusing on the outside zone. Once that is established and the defense is flowing fast to the sideline, the offense comes back with the inside zone.

Yet there is much discussion of what “zone runs” even are. First, there is only so much “zoning” in a zone — much of it is still just blocking the guy in front of you. On all zone runs, the linemen must ask, “Am I ‘covered’ (is there a guy directly in front of me, aside from a linebacker set back a few years)? Or am I ‘uncovered’ (there is no one directly in front of me)?”

If “covered,” there is very little “zoning” at all: The lineman’s job is to block the guy in front of them. Fans, commentators, and even coaches often overcomplicate things. The “zone” aspect comes in with “uncovered” linemen. If “uncovered,” the lineman must step “playside” — i.e. the side the run is going to — and help double-team the defensive linemen along with his “covered” cohort. Once the two of them control that down defensive lineman, one of the offensive linemen slides off to hit a linebacker. It’s not that complicated. Indeed, let’s say the five offensive linemen are covered by five defensive linemen. In that case, each guy (save for maybe the backside offensive tackle) will just block the guy in front of them — there is no “zoning” at all.

It gets a little trickier regarding the difference between inside and outside zones, though this involves technique, not assignment. (And this is where the rabbit hole begins, as there are a zillion coaching points to doing this well, but that is better discussed in a coaching DVD rather than this overview.)

On outside zone plays, the offensive linemen take a bit more of a lateral first step and try to reach the defender across from them. He wants to get his body between the defender and the sideline. It’s important to note, however, that the very act of trying to reach the defender often gets him flying to the sideline, at which time the offensive lineman can then switch to driving the defender to the sideline. The runningback aims for a point outside the tight-end, though he can cut it upfield wherever a seam appears.

Once the defense begins flowing too fast to the sideline, coaches typically dial-up the inside zone. The rules are the same — covered and uncovered — except this is more of a drive block as the aiming point for the runningback is inside. The play often results in a cutback if the defense is flowing fast for the outside zone, but the difference between the outside zone is one of technique, not assignment. And, again, it does not make a difference to the linemen (or at least not much of one) if OU runs this from a four wide set or a two-back one.

On the inside zone the runner aims for the outside hip of the offensive guard. Now, his read can vary by team. Some teams have him read that three technique defensive tackle, while others have him read the middle or “Mike” linebacker. In both cases the idea is for him to find the “vertical” crease — either straight playside off the guard’s hip or backside on a cutback.

A few concluding thoughts. There’s obviously more to it than this. The biggest thing offensive line coaches work on is the initial steps for their linemen (often called a “lateral” or even slightly backwards “bucket step”), and later they work diligently on the proper technique for double-teaming a lineman and then getting up to the “second-level” to block a linebacker. But again, if a defensive “covered” all the linemen, there is no zone. It still comes down to blocking the guy in front of you.

Finally, there are variances. One is the “pin-and-pull” variant of the outside zone or stretch play run by the Indianapolis Colts. Also, for additional reading check out these posts from Trojan Football Analysis on (old-school) Nebraska’s inside and outside zone plays.

Now, this enhanced spread run game should not be confused with the true triple-option stuff, as veer offenses, like Paul Johnson’s flexbone, have certain blocking scheme advantages in that the guys being “optioned” are specifically avoided so as to enable double-team blocks on other defenders — an advantage not present with the zone-read. (This is one reason why many spread teams, including Urban Meyers’s and Rich Rodriguez’s, run the veer nowadays.) But there is no question that, as the spread has gotten older and more entrenched, the cat-and-mouse game between offense and defense has also evolved.

The current evolution has us with the zone-read-triple with a pitch back, and its more nascent cousin, the zone-read triple with a bubble screen. But some coaches are working on even more exotic spread permutations, including what can only be described as the “quadruple option.”

Reading to daylight. Adding a pitch or third-option to the zone read was natural, and served two good functions: it drew attention away from the frontside zone run, the primary focus of the play, and it seriously amped up the big-play capability when the quarterback did pull the ball. The first read of a “zone-read,” it will be recalled is by the quarterback: he reads the backside defensive end, who typically goes unblocked in a zone-rushing scheme to free up blockers for double-teams on the frontside. If the defensive end sits where he is or rushes upfield, the quarterback simple hands the ball off to the runner. But if he chases the runningback, the quarterback pulls the ball. On the base zone-read, the quarterback just looks for any crease to the backside.

But if we add a second read to the play, he know seeks out the outside linebacker or backside support player. He will run right at that player’s outside shoulder. If the defender stays outside or refuses to commit, the quarterback will cut it up inside. Depending on how athletic the QB is — think Pat White or Vince Young — this can be a big gainer. If the linebacker attacks the quarterback though, he pitches it to the runningback or receiver swinging around. This player has to get into a “pitch relationship” with the quarterback, usually something like five to seven yards away and one to two yards behind the quarterback. It is his job to maintain this relationship. The quarterback really only wants to pitch it if the defender flatly attacks him; the worst thing is for a defender to be able to bat down the pitch and recover the ball as a fumble.

All this, outlined clearly below in a diagram from Urban Meyer’s Utah playbook (courtesy of Trojan Football Analysis), was very nearly self-evident once the zone-read appeared, since many coaches (Meyer and Randy Walker included) had experience with the triple-option, pitch backs and pitch phases, secondary reads, and the like. Moreover, it also became necessary as teams began to react to the zone-read with more games. For example, often defenses use a “scrape” tactic where the defensive end crashes for the runner while the linebacker “scrapes” to the quarterback. A quarterback who reads the end will find himself face-to-face with a linebacker. The triple aspect to the play doesn’t remedy all of this, but it limits it, and is another stage in the ongoing evolution of the spread and defensive answers to it. Below is a diagram of the zone-read with a triple phase added on, as well as video clips.

Below are clips of Utah running the zone-read veer under Urban Meyer, courtesy of Trojan Football Analysis, as well as some of West Virginia (courtesy of me). Not that not all these might be strictly the zone-read plus a pitch, as it can sometimes be hard to tell since more teams run the veer. But the principle should be evident.

To show that this need not be a purely college thing, below is a clip of Miami running the pitch phase off the zone-read look:

Bubble your pleasure. The pitch phase from spread is often a bit clunky or obvious, however. Most of these teams don’t base with two runningbacks, and as a result they had to motion a guy in to show it, often tipping off the defense. Plus, one of the points driving the spread is the desire to get the ball to the receivers in space; an offense that ends up compressing itself into two-back formations is, in many peope’s eyes, going the wrong direction.

What coaches did then was to look for ways to get this same tactic but with the same looks they were using. And, since almost all of them already used the bubble screen, that became an obvious answer. Indeed, as the diagram and video below shows, it really is no surprise at all that the bubble screen was the perfect complement to the zone-read, even for teams that hadn’t previously been motioning runningbacks in to get the triple look. Since the pass is behind the line of scrimmage, there is no concern with linemen — who are actively trying to get double-teams and then hit linebackers as part of their zone-blocking responsibilities — getting downfield. (In the pros, the ineligible-man downfield rule applies to all forward passes, so that is a limitation.) After making his zone-read, the runningback reads the same defender; if he cannot cover the bubble screen, the quarterback simply tosses it out there. The outside receivers know to always block. See the diagram and video below. And again, with the video, not all might be strictly the zone-read plus the bubble, but it shows how that play works.

And here is footage of West Virginia and Tulsa doing this. (For more on Tulsa’s version of this, check out Brophy’s blog.)

Quadruple it? The preceding is pretty much where modern offenses are at, and this article could well end here. But some teams have been experimenting with those backside receivers, including by putting them on actual routes. Indeed, when the routes are put together the right way the zone-read can transform into a quadruple option play, because the offense can isolate the backside cornerback or safety while the rest of the D is concerned with the run action. See the diagram below.

This kind of action is particularly attractive against a cover two defense, where the cornerback will squat in the flat, often making the outside receiver’s block for the bubble screen quite difficult. Instead, the offense can high/low this guy, in that if he comes up for the bubble or quick out, the quarterback can stick the ball on the fade route at 18-22 yards deep. (This is not a loft throw, it would be more flat.) Similarly, the quarterback can simple look if the safety is in position to handle the fade, or if he has collapsed down to stop the run. It’s not the world’s easiest read, but it doesn’t have to be. The fade will really only be thrown if they blow the coverage; otherwise he still reads that #2 defender (in the diagram “W”), to put him the same bind as with the zone-read triple with the bubble screen diagrammed above.

Update: Now with video; this is from the CFL, running the quadruple play as I diagrammed it. (Note that the guy in the flat was wide open. Note that this looks more like the veer than the zone-read, but again the principle remains.)

Another interesting permutation that has been common in Canada with teams like Montreal, is putting the backside receivers on a slant/shoot combination — i.e. the outside guy runs a short slant and the inside runs a bubble or route to the flat immediately. I don’t know the exact reads for this, but my impression is that the bubble works the same way with the quarterback putting the outside linebacker in a bind, but the slant can kind of hit behind the run defenders and in front of the safeties for a possible big play.

The one fear obviously with this quadruple option is with linemen getting downfield. That’s one reason that this isn’t an every down adjustment, as when you call this the linemen must know to be more cautious about sprinting downfield to hit linebackers and safeties. Yet that fear should not be overblown, since there is usually a little leeway for linemen who get across the line of scrimmage but don’t necessarily get “downfield.” In other words if a linebacker steps up and your guard hits him two yards past the line of scrimmage, that’s not necessarily an automatic “ineligible man downfield” call. But it’s a concern. Yet, as you can see from the video above the linemen never get too far downfield; they do have about a two-yard cushion where they are safe.

Beyond the zone-read. Both the base zone-read triple option, the zone-read with the bubble, and this quadruple option idea are all evolutions in the ongoing competition between offense and defense. Recently, Herb Hand, offensive coordinator for Tulsa — he formerly shared that title with Gus Malzahn, and also coached with Rich Rodriguez at Clemson and West Virginia — touched on this in a Q&A with spreadoffense.com.

I don’t think that [defenses] are necessarily playing catch-up [to the spread offense]. I think that what you are seeing now from a defensive standpoint is schematic answers to the zone read by giving quarterbacks a variety of looks on the backside of the zone.  I think the defenses are putting a priority on athletic defensive ends that have the ability to quickly change direction which allows them to square-shoulder read the backside of the zone.  I also think there is a big need for ‘space-players’ – guys that can make tackles in the open field.  The defenses that have really given us problems in the past have had very solid safety play, as a lot of spread run game concepts are based on getting the runner in a one-on-one situation with safeties in the open field.  Of course, there are answers to run-stopping safeties in play action passes, which are becoming increasingly more effective when you factor in the spacing conflicts that spread formations present to defenses.

As you can see, the backside is where the action is. When he talks about schematic answers on the backside he’s also referring to those “scrape exchange” schemes I mentioned earlier (and will fully break out in a later post), but the triple-phase is intended to help attack that stuff. The quadruple idea I mentioned is an extension on attacking that secondary support that Hand also mentioned as being critical to defending the spread. Moreover, teams that don’t commit fully to that will still use play-action off the spread run-game to get a similar effect.

A well orchestrated spread is like any other good offense: it presents one basic idea that the team dares you to stop — like the inside and outside zones — and if you overcommit they are ready with heavily practiced answers. Defenses are still reacting to the looks the spread gives, and as a result offenses keep proposing new ideas. That’s what makes it so fun.